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1 Introduction
The mission of sustainable development is in several respects extra
demanding for the guidance of societal change (Bressers & Rosenbaum
2000: 532-536). This is one of the reasons that in social science studies on
sustainable development, even more than in other domains, the concept of
‘government policy’ often has been more or less replaced by the broader
concept of ‘governance’.
In recent decades there have been many changes in how the term
‘government policy’ is understood. Views on government policy have changed
in recent years through a growing recognition that government alone does not
determine the future development of sectors in society, but that this is shaped
through the interaction of many actors. Within such networks of actors, the
government can adopt a position that is more central and dominant or one
that is less so. This change in view represents a shift in accent from
government policy, or ‘government’, to ‘governance’. The ‘governance’ pattern
consists of all the consequences of the interplay between attempts to
intervene by all the actors involved (Kooiman 1993: 258).
In addition, interest is growing in the fact that sectors in society are not
governed on one level, or on a number of separate levels, but through
interaction between these levels. These levels often reflect the various tiers of
government, but do not have to; other powerful actors may be present that
provide direction at a certain level where no government authority is active. In
the same way, actors may also operate on more than one level. One reason
for this is a growing recognition that the problem situation itself often contains
various interacting levels (such as environmental problems). This whole has
been called ‘multi-level governance’.
Governance is a broad term, making it suitable for our purposes; but it
is also a confusing term which is used in many different ways in the literature
(Peters & Pierre 1998, Lynn et al. 2000-a, 2000-b: 234, O’Toole 2000: 276).
Björk & Johansson (2000: 1) state in their review paper: ‘There are almost as
many ideas of governance as there are researchers in the field.’ So there is
clearly a need for a more synthesizing elaboration of this conception.
This chapter develops such an elaboration a model of ‘governance’ as an aid
for comparing governance structures. Various current approaches in policy
science focus on changes in government policy when making comparisons
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Baumgartner & Jones 1993). Next to
such focus on (long-term) changes in policy (diachronic study), also
comparing policies in a certain sector in different areas (synchronic study)
should be supported by the elaboration of ‘governance’ that we develop in
this chapter. As far as developments in time are described, this is primarily
intended to provide indications of the relations between the various elements
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the actual interaction processes (activities and interactions between actors)
than the more structural elements of governance, which form both the inputs
and outputs of such policy processes. In the context of this volume we will
give some extra attention to the distribution of governance between the
various scales and levels.
The questions examined by this chapter are:
1. Which elements make up a governance structure?
2. In what ways do these elements influence each other?
In section 2 we develop a model of governance based on various approaches
taken in studies of public administration. In developing our vision on the
elements of the term ‘governance’, we start with the term ‘policy’ and expand
this, using various elements, into ‘governance pattern’. Section 3 presents a
vision of the mutual influences between the elements of governance,
including the multi-scale issue. Section 4 provides a short conclusion. The
model as developed theoretically here will be applied to the comparison of
water management in Florida and the Netherlands in Chapter 6.
2   Elements of governance
2.1  Introduction
In this part of the chapter we will try to develop as complete a model as
possible of the elements of a ‘governance pattern’. Using this model, we can
compare the governance patterns and the changes they undergo in different
sectors and/or different places. We develop this model through a synthesis of
policy science approaches, and the different emphases in various approaches
each have a place in the model. When developing the model we start from
the concept of ‘policy’, which we build up using the various elements until we
arrive at a ‘governance pattern’.
For this purpose we will draw on different literatures. Both in the
literature that sails under the flag of ‘governance’ and in the more general
policy science literature there is an overwhelming load of various aspects that
can and should be considered for including in a synthesis model of
governance. At first glance this may seem to make this endeavor a ‘mission
impossible’. But here it is helpful that there is a considerable amount of ‘old
wine in new sacks’. Many new approaches present only one or two new
aspects or a new emphasis on one or two known aspects. So it makes sense
to first state our own starting point explicitly, and then expand it with specific
additions from the literature.
2.2  Interaction processes and ‘instrumentation theory’
The policy science approach as it developed at the University of Twente
emphasizes the character of policy processes as social interaction processes.
Over the years attention has shifted from viewing policy as a sort of
production process with semi-finished products and an end product to a vision
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vision the course and outcomes of the processes depend not only on the
inputs to the process but mainly on the characteristics of the actors involved,
particularly their objectives, information and power. All other factors that
influence the process do so because and in so far as, they influence the
characteristics of the actors involved. This also applies to the influence of
policy instruments. Not all characteristics of actors, however, are determined
by policy, and so it is not possible to describe a policy without paying attention
to the actors involved in that policy themselves (Bressers, 1983).
Moreover, the processes in this vision are not only linked in one series
or cycle, but are part of a large number of societal processes in which
government authorities sometimes participate and sometimes do not. All
these processes are connected to other processes in a complicated web via
their inputs and outputs, and possibly indirectly linked to all other processes.
Each definition of a sector of society draws a more or less arbitrary boundary
round a cluster of processes in this web. While the boundaries between policy
development and policy implementation often are somewhat diffuse in
research practice they are often drawn to coincide with those between a
higher and lower tiers of government (Bressers & Honigh 1986).
The ‘instrumentation theory’ which stems from these perspectives,
focuses on the application and effects of instruments on the target groups of
policy (Bressers & Klok 1988, Klok 1991, Bressers 2001). It also takes
account of the fact that instruments do not influence the characteristics of the
actors involved separately but rather as a package or as an ‘instrument
strategy’. Instruments and strategies have various properties, for example a
certain proportionality between target group behavior and government
reaction to this behavior, or giving resources to the target group or taking
these resources away from the target group. Such properties of instrument
strategies affect their applicability in practice. Klok emphasizes that some of
the instruments are designed to give those implementing the policy the power
to apply other instruments (Klok 1991: 176-194) and also that the
implementing organizations depend on being equipped with sufficient capacity
and expertise (idem: 163-164; see also Bressers 1983: 218-237 and 256-
274). In his thesis, Arentsen (1991) exhaustively discusses the relation
between the policy organization and policy implementation.
Later publications on this approach (Bressers & Kuks 1992; Bressers,
O’Toole & Richardson 1994; Bressers, Huitema & Kuks 1994) have paid
more attention to the interrelations between the actors, including actors that
do not directly participate in the processes under examination. Klok (1995)
gives primary importance to the allocation and removal of resources in such
relations and in the classification of policy instruments. The mutual relations
between actors within such policy networks are seen as an important factor in
the development of the content of policy (Bressers 1998, Bressers & O’Toole
1998, Ligteringen 1999). In addition, the relation between policy processes at
the various administrative levels is explicitly dealt with (Bressers, Kuks &
Ligteringen 1998). During this theoretical development, the approach to policy
as an interactive process and the instrumentation theory based on this
gradually grew into an integrative policy science approach, uniting elements
from a variety of other approaches.
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(1) Administrative- and other scale levels, (2) Actors in the policy network, (3)
Objectives, (4) Strategies and instruments, (5) Organization and resources of
implementation. In the next subsection we’ll compare these elements with the
issues that are emphasized in a part of the literature that deals explicitly with
‘governance’. While doing this we will also make some limitations of our
elaborated model explicit.
2.3 Governance literature
If you examine the literature in which the term ‘governance’ is prominent, the
first impression is of the many ways the term is used and the range of
different contexts in which it is used. Although our goal is to broaden this
policy concept, we must inevitably make an initial choice from among this
diversity of approaches. The following discussion is an introduction to the way
we use the term ‘governance’ in relation to the diversity of uses in the
literature.
Rhodes (1996) lists six categories of publications on governance. Our
impression is that two of these differ rather strongly from the other categories,
in both interpretation and context (compare Björk & Johansson 2000: 1).
‘Corporate governance’ comprises a large number of theories and studies on
the management of companies, often from a stakeholder perspective. ‘Good
governance’ is a term that is often used in development studies to indicate the
administrative capacity as the context for sustainable or otherwise successful
development. In these two categories of publications the term is generally
used without a very specific meaning, in about the same way as we would
use the term ‘administration’.
The other four categories are, in our opinion, more closely related to each
other and to the debate within the policy science community. We will return to
these later. But first, there is a seventh school represented by numerous
publications, that of ‘international governance’. Within the field of international
relations it has long been usual to refer to the administrative relations within
and between various international organizations and associations by the term
‘governance’. Many of these publications use the term without further
explanation and implicitly meaning much the same as ‘public administration’
(e.g. Marks et al. 1996, Hovden 2000, Jordan 2000). Other publications do
make specific use of the term ‘governance’ (e.g. Young 1994, Rosenau
2000), and these are assigned to the other categories depending on the
meaning given to the concept. The first limitation on the way in which we use
the term ‘governance’, therefore, is that we ignore the use of the term in
business administration, development studies and international relations in so
far as it simply means ‘administration’, or in any case has a place in debates
outside the public administration or policy science disciplines.
The other four categories of publications that Rhodes identifies are: the
minimal state, new public management, socio-cybernetic systems theory, and
self-regulating networks. The common factor in all these is that they search
5for forms of coordination that do not fit comfortably with the ‘market’–
‘hierarchy’ distinction (compare Arentsen & Künneke 1996, Rosenau 2000:
11–16). At the beginning of the 1980s there was talk of ‘overloaded polities’ in
which ‘regime stability is threatened by…the related problems of
governmental effectiveness and popular consent.’ (Rose 1980). The reaction
to this was ‘less state and more market’. But this in turn raised further
questions. Thinking in terms of governance is also an answer to the ‘erosion
of the state’ during the 1980s. Rhodes (1997: 19) writes: ‘The process of
hollowing out…is central to understand the shift from a unitary state to a
differentiated polity.’ Instead of discussing these four categories separately
(see e.g. Börk & Johansson 2000: 3–7) we prefer to introduce another
distinction.
Each of these approaches is built to a greater or lesser degree not (only) on
an empirical vision but also, and more importantly, on a normative vision. This
normative vision or (bias) almost always implies that a more limited role or
presence of government authorities delivers better governance. This bias is
weakest in the ‘socio-cybernetic approach’ (e.g. the work of Kooiman (1994),
which we think is proposed as a rather one-sided exponent of this bias) and
most obvious in the idea of the minimal state. However, in this article the
normative debate is not our greatest interest. Here we investigate the
administrative aspects, which are highlighted under the banner of
‘governance’, and which possibly deserve a place in a broad description of
the administration of a certain field at a specified time and place. Therefore,
the second limitation on the way in which we use the term ‘governance’ in this
article is that we ignore the normative debate on the role of government
authorities, in which the term is often used (as it is elsewhere, see Kuks
2000). Implicitly, our position in the debate is that ‘governance without
government’ (Peters & Pierre 1998: 223) is not a goal in itself.
The final limitation is related to this issue. Some authors are looking mainly for
a more or less stable institutional arrangement in addition to the market, in
which communities of private actors are able, without ‘outside intervention’, to
promote their collective interests. In contrast, our interest does lie in such
‘outside interventions’, irrespective of whether they are intentional or not, or
undertaken by one or more government authorities with horizontal or vertical
(hierarchic) relations. In doing this we concentrate more on change than
stability. It also means that many of the rules-in-use, customs and traditions,
property rights, etc. are seen more as the subject matter of governance to be
influenced – and as such part of the instrumental strategy – rather than as
being the main business of the governance system (compare Young 1994: ix
and 1631).
It is because these institutional rules can be considered as a description of
the arena in which the actors operate, and so can be linked to the modules of
instrument theory (Fenger & Klok 2000), that we are looking for their context:
                                           
1 Although Young looks for the substance of governance in institutional arrangements, March
& Olson (1995: 11) put thinking in terms of governance opposite the institutional perspective,
as a consequence of the ‘exchange’ perspective. For them ‘the core artistry of governance is
winning coalitions and policies’. Clearly, we do not agree with either.
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implementation of policy shows that many people do not apply for rent rebate
because they do not realize that they fall within the scope of the regulations,
or do not want to ask for money, or do not feel they have the right to a rent
rebate, this provides direct explanations for their behavior. But it raises a
further question: what is the explanation-behind-the-explanation? In the next
section, therefore, we will not treat institutional approaches instead of other
policy science approaches, but alongside them.
Multi-level coordination & multi-faceted problems
The term ‘multi-level’ has become the most common prefix attached to
‘governance’. It relates not only to its multiple nature but also particularly to
the mutual interdependence between levels (Smith 1997). According to
Lundqvist (2001) the challenge of ‘environmental governance’ is to develop
‘social choice mechanisms that combine two ostensibly incompatible qualities:
authoritative (including the possibility of state intervention) and flexible, self-
adjusting and “reflective”, with a considerable influence on those governed.’
Further, there is a ‘more encompassing multi-level view of governance
needed’, for one reason because ‘problems (like sustainability issues) are
multi-faceted’. The component problems ‘require different scales .. and the
interactions between the scales require multi-level coordination’. Without such
coordination there may be a ‘race to the bottom’, with disastrous implications
for the social problem. But this does not have to involve a higher authority. In
certain circumstances, multi-level or ‘inter-level games’ can lead to a ‘race to
the top’ (Scharpf 1997). Blomquist & Schlager (1999: 7, 39–43) also
emphasize the relation between the many facets of the problem and the
horizontal and vertical coordination this requires. The same goes for Rosenau
(2000: 10–11).
Multi-actor networks
Rosenau (2000: 5) also assumes the multi-level character of governance.  He
talks of ‘…evolution of “multi-level” governance, a form of rule in which
authority is voluntary and legally dispersed among the various levels of
community where problems are located and local needs require attention.’
But a little later he adds a second element, the ‘…shifting the balance
between hierarchical and network forms of organization, between vertical
flows of authority and horizontal flows.’ He also draws on Rhodes (2000: 60),
citing: ‘Networks are the analytical heart of the notion of governance in the
Study of Public Administration.’ One of the advantages ascribed to networks
is that they are essential for learning processes (Knoepfel & Kissling 1998).
Kickert (1997), in his overview of ‘public governance in the Netherlands’ (and
in his other work), pays much attention to network approaches.
Multi-instrumental steering mechanisms and multi-resource-based
implementation
O’Toole (2000: 276–279) treats governance in the context of studies of the
implementation of policy strategies. He calls governance ‘difficult to denote
with precision’, but as well as the multi-level and multi-actor aspects he points
to ‘the multivariate character of policy action’. He refers to Milward & Provan
(1999: 3), who state: ‘The essence of governance is its focus on governing
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authority and sanctions of government.’ He also points to the work of Lynn et
al. (2000-a&b), who approach governance from the public management
perspective, with roots in the political economy literature. Although they set
themselves the task of developing a broad and comprehensive model of
governance, their background is clearly present in their thinking. They begin
by stating that policy programs are implemented in a web of many diverse
actors, an assumption about policy implementation that marks it out from the
rest of the literature. As a consequence, the model of governance they go on
to develop concentrates not only on the objectives (including output
indicators) and instruments (‘treatment’) of policy, but also emphasizes the
resources and organization of implementation. The model differs from more
usual overviews mainly because it clearly shows that these aspects of
organization and resources can take a wide variety of forms and have a multi-
functional character (p. 257–258). Peters & Pierre (1998: 226–227) also
consider, besides the emphasis on networks, the ‘blending of public and
private resources’ and ‘the use of multiple instruments’ to be features of the
governance concept.
This exploration of the governance literature has not turned up much in the
way of new elements for the five aspects mentioned at the end of section 2.2,
but it has slightly broadened our definition of them. In our opinion, the
elements of governance are:
1. Levels (not necessarily administrative levels): governance assumes the
general multi-level character of policy implementation.
2. Actors in the policy network: governance assumes the multi-actor
character of policy implementation.
3. Perception of the problem and objectives (not just the objectives):
governance assumes the multi-faceted character of the problems and
objectives of policy implementation.
4. Strategies and instruments: governance assumes the multi-instrumental
character of policy strategies for policy implementation.
5. Resources and organization of implementation: governance assumes the
complex multi-resource basis for policy implementation.
Using these five elements, we believe the governance pattern can be
described for a certain policy field in a specified place and time. But what
should be described within the framework of these five elements? Which
questions (or indicators) can operationalise these elements (or dimensions).
As the governance literature itself has given no clear answer to this, the
obvious step in this situation is to work from a broader inventory. In the next
section we describe these five elements of governance in more detail.
2.4 Visions and synthesis
These elements were further developed using various policy science
approaches. Of course, many of these approaches have other purposes than
identifying elements of the content of policy and governance. For example,
8they may be used to explain long-term policy changes, or the effectiveness of
policy instruments. It was not the intention to do justice to the approaches in
their own right, but to use these approaches as sources of inspiration for our
goal of building as complete a model as possible of governance structures
Moreover, an ‘injustice’ was done to most approaches in the sense that
they were not left intact, but only the most specific features highlighted.
Aspects that are also to be found in other approaches and that generally tend
to soften the bias in these specific features in a certain approach were not
treated. The intention was not to judge these approaches but to enrich our
approach to ‘governance’ in the light of the wealth of aspects brought to light
by the policy science approaches examined. The extended analysis was
published separately in Dutch (Bressers & Kuks 2001). Here we only report
on some conclusions.
In their classical treatments of decision making Herbert A. Simon (1997
(1945)) ‘bounded rationality’ and  Lindblom’s ‘incrementalism’ (Lindblom
1959; Braybrooke & Lindblom 1970 (1963)) emphasize the limited human
capacity to process information. Opening up the possibilities of non-
incremental policy changes has to do with ‘megapolicy changes’ (cf. Dror
1971), that involve a recognition of new problems, or other ways to frame
them, or a new conception of the task of government. Allison’s (1971)
‘bureaucracy model’ specifically addresses the standard approaches and
repertoires of organizations, which restrict flexibility in conducting policy.
The ‘rule-based’ institutional rational choice approach (Kiser & Ostrom 1982,
Ostrom 1990, 1999) draws a/o. the attention to the way in which actors enter
the policy network or are excluded from it. Furthermore ‘scope’ rules
determine the extent of certain positions, competencies and other sources of
power. Another aspect of Ostrom’s approach is that she makes a distinction
between the different levels of analysis. This layered structure of the rule
context is not the same as a classification of administrative layers. A
compromise between both interpretations of the term ‘level’ could be to speak
about levels within a concept of ‘multilevel governance’, in which the other
level often, but not always, and not by definition, also has its own
characteristic administrative level.
In the ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (Sabatier 1988, 1991, Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith 1999) what is of particular importance is the idea that there are
coalitions of actors in the policy network that do not just simply represent the
division between government and other actors, but contain actors from both
of these groups and are based on common beliefs. Regarding the beliefs of
actors, we can identify various layers. In the ‘deep core’ issues are relating to
fundamental values. The ‘policy core’ contains positions relating to the
perception of problems, the division of the costs of policy implementation, the
desirability of contributions from experts, politicians and the general public
and other relevant values and preferences. The ‘derived aspects’ contain
elaborations for each given situation. Besides this layered structure what is
also important to us is the importance that is attached to the perception of the
problem. Next to ‘advocacy coalitions’, there are actors who are more likely to
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and these actors are referred to by Sabatier as political brokers.
The flow model of the policy process (Kingdon 1995 (1984), Zahariadis 1999)
examines how three relatively autonomous flows come together each time a
decision has to be made. Political ‘entrepreneurs’ promote this by making use
of ‘windows of opportunity’ (or creating them). From a multi-scale perspective
the convergence of problem perception, policy opportunities and political
salience should not take place at different levels (as, for example, when there
is concern about a problem at a single state level while solutions are being
sought at the federal level).
In the ‘actor centered institutionalism’ of Scharpf (1997) explanation takes
place primarily in terms of the distribution of preferences for alternatives.
Much attention is also paid to information, but only to direct information and
not so much to frameworks for interpretation (see below).
A large number of current theories in policy sciences can be characterized as
cognitive approaches: ‘cognitive maps’ (Axelrod 1976), ‘frames’ (Schön 1983
and Schön & Rein 1994), ‘discourses’ (Dryzek 1987, 1997), argumentation
and the ‘social construction’ of reality (Fischer 1995 and with Forrester 1993,
Milbrath 1993) and ‘cultural theory’ (Thompsom, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990,
Schwarz & Thompsom 1990). Characteristic for these theories is that they all
emphasize that the behavior of actors rests on their subjective interpretation
of reality. And furthermore that this subjective interpretation is formed
because observations of actors are given a place in frameworks of
interpretation that provide meaning to these observations, but also distort
them. Think of the well-known adagio: ‘What is believed to be real is real in its
consequences’. The differences between the various theories are to be found
especially in the way in which the frameworks of interpretation are
conceptualized. In this respect one can observe a certain tendency from more
individual to more collective frameworks of interpretation. For our model the
above theories have the consequence that we will pay attention in the first
element to the access to the societal debate and the acceptance of the role of
government. With the problem perception there should be attention for the
images of reality that act as filters with the interpretation of observations and
for the degree to which uncertainties are accepted as one of the indicators for
the degree in which one is in need of such images in order to prevent a
feeling of uncertainty. With the strategies it is important to view whether the
chosen instruments provide incentives to learn, in other words to exceed
existing images of reality. Often for that purpose flexible instruments and
indirect steering methods are used.
2.5  A model of governance in five elements
At the end of this section we come to the conclusion that the approaches
examined have added some specifications to the identified five elements of
governance, but that these in themselves remain intact. Based partly on the
previous discussion and partly on a slightly more detailed representation of
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the specifications from the previously examined approaches, we arrive at the
following description of the five elements of the governance structure we have
identified. In its shortest form the ‘governance model’ consists of five
questions: Where? Who? What? How? and With what? A characteristic
feature of modern ‘governance’ systems is that they have many aspects.
They are: multilevel, multi-actor, multifaceted, multi-instrumental and multi-
resource-based.
(1) Levels of governance
Where? – Multilevel
Which levels of governance dominate policy and the debate on conducting
policy, and in which relations? What is the relation with the administrative
levels of government? Who decides or influences such issues? How is the
interaction between the various administrative levels arranged?
(2) Actors in the policy network
Who? – Multi-actor
How open is the policy arena in theory and practice, and to whom? Who is
actually involved and with what exactly? What is their position? What is the
accepted role for government? Who have relevant ownership and use rights
or are stakeholders in some other capacity (including policy-implementing
organizations)? What is the structural inclination to cooperate among actors in
the network? Are there actors among them who operate as process brokers
or ‘policy entrepreneurs’? What is the position of the general public versus
experts versus politicians?
(3) Problem perception and objectives
What? – Multifaceted
What are the dominant maps of reality? What is seen as a problem and how
serious is this considered to be? What do people see as the causes of this
problem? Is the problem considered to be a problem for individuals or a
problem for society as a whole? What values and other preferences are
considered to be at stake? Which functions are allocated to the sector? Is the
problem seen as a relatively new and challenging topic or as a topic in the
‘management’ phase without much political ‘salience’? To what degree is
uncertainty accepted? Where are the recognized points of intervention? What
relations with other policy fields are recognized as coordination topics? Which
policy objectives are accepted? What are levels to which policy makers aspire
(ambition) in absolute terms (level of standards) and relative terms (required
changes in society)?
(4) Strategy and instruments
How? – Multi-instrumental
Which instruments belong to the policy strategy? What are the characteristics
of these instruments? What are the target groups of the policy and what is the
timing of its application? How much flexibility do the instruments provide? To
what extent are multiple and indirect routes to action used? Are changes in
the ownership and use rights within the sector anticipated? To what extent do
they provide incentives to ‘learn’? What requirements do they place on the
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availability of resources for implementation?2 How are the costs and benefits
of the policy distributed?
(5) Responsibilities and resources for implementation
With what? – Multi-resource-based
Which organizations (including government organizations) are responsible for
implementing the policy?  What is the repertoire of standard reactions to
challenges known to these organizations? What authority and other resources
are made available to these organizations by the policy? With what
restrictions?
In the next section we examine the types of connections that can be expected
between the five elements of the governance structure.
3 Patterns and dynamics
3.1 Introduction
In this section we describe the relations between the five elements of
governance. The assumed relations between the five elements described in
this chapter are based on the basic principle that the elements of policy each
form the context of the other elements and that they will tend to adjust to each
other if not affected by outside influences.
By choosing mutual adjustment as a basic principle, emphasis is
placed on stability rather than change. Nevertheless, such a model also offers
a framework for explaining change. Changes in the external context of factors
that are not considered to be part of the governance model can influence one
or more of the elements. Through the same mechanisms of mutual interaction
this can in turn lead to changes in all the elements of the governance model.
Of course there are various other theories with basic mechanisms to
explain stability and change (e.g. Lindblom 1959, Wildavsky 1982, with
Thompson & Ellis 1990, Hogwood & Peters 1983, Kingdon 1984, Luhmann
1984, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999, Baumgartner & Jones 1993
etceteras, etceteras). Some emphasize forms of conflict, some more gentle
forms of adjustment. Some emphasize external shocks, some internal
dynamics. Some emphasize interactions between actors, some
confrontations or merges of visions. Nevertheless, what struck us in all these
theories was that through all their different emphases, there shimmered a
joint basic conception, namely that of a basic assumption of ‘more or less
vulnerable equilibrium’. As a consequence they all share the idea that there is
a tendency that the better a development in one aspect ‘fits’ with the context
of other aspects, the more likely is the development to continue and vice
versa. That this doesn’t lead to a static situation is because of numerous
external inputs that fuel almost continuous change processes that seem so
                                           
2 For example, some systems of emission charges or tradable licences may require so much
information that it makes them almost impossible to apply. The fine tuning of the instrument is
very important in this respect, and can make the difference between an effective intervention
and a dead end.
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ubiquitous that that character as ‘adaptation processes’ gets almost hidden.
So we take up the old idea of ‘mutual adaptation, but this time not restricted
to the adaptation of actors or interests like in the ‘Lindblomian’ sense, but in a
broader sense encompassing all the elements of governance we developed
in the above section.
The idea of mutual adjustment also offers the possibility of explaining
differences between the situations in two or more countries (see Chapter 6 on
the differences in governance in the field of groundwater protection and
drinking water policy in Florida and the Netherlands). Differences in external
factors, for example in geological and hydrological features, or in solidly
grounded aspects of governance, for example the constitutional allocation of
competencies to government authorities, will, according to this idea, indirectly
bring about a series of differences in (other) elements of governance.
There is a certain ‘logical’ relation between the five elements of
governance. This, however, means no more than that it is easy to see why
each previous element imposes harder or softer limitations on aspects of the
following element. In this sense, these influences create a situation in which
the elements are adjusted to suit each other. In our opinion, however, there is
no a priori reason for thinking that the mutual influences between the
elements is restricted to this alone. In principle, the idea of mutual adjustment
means that there is every reason to believe that all 25 mutual influences are
possible. All elements form the context for the others and can therefore be
both independent and dependent variables. This means that we can
distinguish 25 hypotheses.
3.2  Premises
The premises and mechanisms that lie at the heart of these hypotheses are
as follows.
(1) The best predictor of the status of an element at t2 is its status at t1. Each
change takes up energy and will not take place if the governance system is in
balance. Only changes in other situations (within and outside the ‘governance
system’ and via the efforts of the actors) can bring about changes. This idea
forms the basis for the five ‘continuation’ hypotheses, in which an element
influences itself.
(2) The elements in the model mentioned earlier form a more or less limiting
or determining context for later elements. The division of the conduct of policy
between administrative levels activates networks that are active primarily at
these levels. Those participating in these policy networks are, of course,
those who give shape to the perception of the problem and the ambitions in
the public debate and subsequently in the policy itself. These in turn are the
focus of the discussion about policy strategies, for one reason because
certain actors are considered to be a target group while others are not an
because certain intervention points in the policy field are utilized while others
are not. The selected strategies and the instruments that are part of these in
turn require the availability of an implementation structure and resources to
make implementation possible (see also footnote 1 by the diagram below).
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These ideas form the basis for the four ‘logical order’ hypotheses. The five
elements form a sort of cascade of influence.
(3) This ‘logical order’ of influence, however, is not the only way in which
(changes in) elements of the ‘governance cascade’ can influence each other.
In fact, we believe that all the other conceivable 16 relations are possible,
including the influence of elements mentioned later on earlier mentioned
elements. All 25 relations should be considered because it is possible that the
influence of the ‘network’ on the strategy works via the influence of the former
on the ‘ambition’, etc.
(4) The general idea behind all these relations is that they promote the mutual
adjustment of elements. According to this idea, dynamics will always have an
external sources, which may consist of (a) major social developments, such
as demographic, cultural, economic or physical (technological and spatial)
developments, and (b) developments in other policy fields (Ligteringen 1998:
214-215 and following).
(5) All these mutual influences do not occur of themselves but need
processes of social interaction to bring them about. In the description of the
governance system here, however, we do not explore further the process side
of the system, but only go into the elements that are (re)produced by these
processes (as outputs of processes) and which in turn again form a context
for other processes (as inputs to processes). By accepting that the relations
actually work through processes of social interaction means that we can best
explore the assumed relations between the elements on the basis of what we
see as the central factors in such processes (Bressers 1983; Bressers & Klok
1988; Klok 1991, Bressers 2001).
(6) An adjustment may take place along three possible perspectives, referring
to: objectives (‘desire’, ultimate basis: values), information (‘knowledge’,
ultimate basis: cognition) and power (‘ability’, ultimate basis: resources). The
mechanism of mutual adjustment, distributed over the five elements of the
governance system, will tend to make values consistent, to make cognitions
fit better into a common framework for interpretation and to make resources
act to mutually facilitate the elements. But take note: just as in mechanism 1
and 2, these are not compulsory determinants but probabilistic influences,
taken for the moment to be preliminary working hypotheses. In essence, the
influences also play a role in the ‘logical order’ of the elements in the model.
(7) In principle, of course, every relation can be conceived as working from all
three perspectives described above. An attempt will be made to do this later.
Before we discuss each hypothesis separately we examine the three
perspectives (desire, knowledge, ability).
3.3  Values, cognitions and resources
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Why are objectives, information and power (with values, cognition and
resources in the background) the useful perspectives when examining the
relations between the five elements of the governance model? As we have
indicated above this has to do with the fact that the relations between the
elements are brought about by processes of social interaction. These three
perspectives have proved themselves to be exceptionally useful in explaining
the dynamics of such processes. First look at what is needed to make a
relatively simple object: making a chair requires the carpenter to have an
object in mind, and it requires expertise and resources, such as tools and
materials. In a multiple-actor process goals also relate to the position relative
to other actors as well as do information and resources (the last providing
‘power’). There is also a long tradition of thinking in terms of these
perspectives (Bressers 1983: 352-328).
A second way of clarifying the three perspectives is to link them to ideas on
policy instruments. Policy instruments are often classified into rules,
incentives and communication. This, in our opinion, does not so much reflect
different policy instruments but different ways in which they exert their
influence. Regulations are not always couched in terms of compulsory rules
but may also work by influencing the outcome of balancing the costs and
benefits of alternative patterns of behavior (incentives) and ensuring that
attention is given to certain alternative forms of behavior (communication).
Subsidies are not only incentives but are also linked to conditions (rules) and
information (communication) as well. Communication, certainly two-way
communication, often leads to agreements being made, such as covenants or
voluntary agreements (rules) and the exchange of concessions, for example
acceptance of change in exchange for flexible timing (incentives). In other
words, these are aspects of all policy instruments rather than separate groups
of instruments. The fact that this classification of instruments still remains so
important has more to do with their connections with the perspectives based
on societal interaction processes than with their usefulness for this purpose.
A third way of illustrating their rich significance is to relate the three
perspectives even broader to social science disciplines. There is a certain
connection between these disciplines and the three perspectives mentioned
above. This connection is partial, though, and relates to the core principles of
these disciplines rather than any details, making a distinction in principle
between individual and social methods of considerations.
The fundamental concept in economics is the scarcity of resources and
the decisions and bartering that result from this. In its most classical version,
the complexities of all other aspects (the social, cognitive and value aspects)
are reduced to assumptions of ‘methodological individualism’, ‘complete
information’ and ‘individual behavior that maximizes benefits’. If ‘benefit’
cannot simply be equated with money, multiple objectives are formulated, for
example ‘bureaucrats strive to obtain as large a budget as possible’. This is,
in essence, an unethical and pragmatic premise. So, to sum up: ‘A: that which
gives the greatest benefit will be chosen.’
In political science the social aspect of the distribution of resources,
and so the power of one actor over another, are emphasized. Reasoning,
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then, is about the question of who is going to dominate the field. To sum up:
‘B: Whoever has the most power is free to choose.’
Sociology is partly about understanding social problems and
psychology is partly about human skill in collecting and processing
information. To sum up: ‘C: It is not the facts that are important, but how what
is observed is interpreted.’ (Or: ‘What is believed to be real is real in its
consequences.’)
Social psychology and communication sciences emphasize the
transfer of information in mutual communication processes. Also, the role of
information collection and processing is often emphasized in the process of
making choices and power relations (and of the development of values). Also
the ‘argumentative turn’ in policy sciences (Fischer & Forrester 1993) fits
largely into this track. To sum up: ‘D: Interpretations of reality are the product
of a social construction.’
The value aspect is pivotal in ethics and other areas of philosophy. To
sum up: ‘E: People should want what is good.’
Regarding normative social aspects, imposing values on others, for
example the whole community, we enter the domain of the law. To sum up:
‘F: The limits to what is good are set by rules.’
Of course, this characterization of perspectives (and certainly of associated
disciplines) is too simple when forced into a simple matrix. Each scientific
discipline can borrow elements from the other cells. In doing so, though, it is
often clear that they reject some of their own principles and integrate some of
the principles of other social sciences into their own set of considerations.
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Scientific Perspectives Individual Social
Resources (power) a. Choosing the greatest
benefit
b. Those with most
power can choose
Cognitions (information) c. It is not the facts that
are important but how
what is observed is
interpreted
d. Interpretations of
reality are the product of
social construction
Values (objectives) e. People should want
what is good
f. The limits to what is
good are set by rules
All in all, the above shows, in our opinion, the value and significance of
following these perspectives when quite a complete picture is required of the
relations between social science concepts, such as the elements of the
governance system identified by us. After this account of the power and
significance of the three perspectives used in this chapter, we now formulate
the assumptions and hypotheses used in this study.
3.4  Assumptions
Main assumption: The influences that the five elements of governance exert
on each other will promote the mutual adjustment of these elements in a
governance system.
Subsidiary assumption: Changes within a governance system occur because
other factors ‘from outside’ alter characteristic features of one or more of the
five elements to a greater or lesser degree, and the other elements adjust
themselves to this.
The main assumption rests on three mechanisms. These can be formulated
as secondary assumptions and applied in hypotheses on the relations
between elements of governance.
Secondary assumption 1: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the tendency towards an increase in the
mutual consistency of the values that play a role in these elements if there are
no disturbances from outside.
Secondary assumption 2: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the tendency of the cognition that plays
a role in these elements to fit into a common framework for interpretation if
there are no disturbances from outside.
Secondary assumption 3: The influences that the five elements of governance
exert on each other arise partly from the dependence in each of these
elements on resources from the other elements.  
The hypotheses that are based on these assumptions are informative and not
tautological because, in the first place, it is conceivable that ‘disturbances
from outside’ are so numerous nowadays that the tendencies listed are not
recognizable in the empirical data, even when they are in principle not
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incorrect. In the second place, the core ideas can also be questioned, for
example from a ‘post-modern’ perspective in which the autonomous tendency
towards fragmentation and coexistence of values and cognition is
emphasized.
The hypotheses are testable because the mutual relations between the
elements, both in comparisons between cases and comparisons in time, can
be mapped and can be compared with what is to be expected according to
the hypotheses. To this end it is necessary to specify the expected relations
between the elements of governance using all three mechanisms at the same
time. This will be done in the next sub-section, followed by a summary table.
We will limit ourselves here to the influences from and on the level aspect of
governance, since these are especially relevant for this volume on
‘governance across social scales’.
3.5 The interaction between the level aspect and the other elements of
governance
The influence of the level aspect on the relevant actors in the policy network
is a ‘logical’ one, in the sense that the relative importance of various levels
translates in the multi-scale setup of where to seek the relevant policy
network(s). The other four relations we will examine in some more detail.
Below the arrows in the headings represent a tendency for the second named
element to adjust to the first named element.
Level → Problem and ambition
From the value perspective we can expect that the sort of values that
characterize a certain level of administration will work through in the
perception of the problem and the policy ambition. Many values are not
peculiar to a particular administrative level, but the administrative level
provides an indication of the level at which equality or balance is sought.
From the cognitive perspective (interpretation frameworks) the problem will be
perceived at the level from which it is viewed. The problem of waste, for
example, looks different at the national level (e.g. safe processing) than at the
local level (e.g. impact of waste processing plants).
From the perspective of resources the dominant level, as ‘owner’ of the
problem, will tend to conduct the debate about the problem and policy
ambition as it affects that level. If there are other levels that have a strong
position this may lead to fragmentation of the perception of the problem and
policy ambition.
In the end, the composition of aspects that play a role in the perception
of the problem and policy ambition will be partly determined by the status of
the various levels. When the position of the European Union strengthened at
the domain of energy policy it became a problem not only of secure delivery
and reducing the environmental burden, but also of domestically restricted
markets that should be liberalized.
Level → Strategies
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From the perspective of values, there are not many values linked to the
selection of the administrative level, except the values held at the level at
which a balance is desired (equality). The choice of strategy will reflect this.
From the cognitive perspective, strategies will be developed primarily for
dealing with the problem at the level at which the policy is being developed or
at least from which there is a clear view of the problem. If governance is
divided between a number of levels, policy strategies will be developed at
more than one level.
From the resources/dominance perspective there will be a tendency to select
policy strategies that do not threaten the distribution of responsibilities for
developing policy at the various levels.
In the end, we see here, too, that the characteristics of the chosen
strategies will to a certain extent reflect the distribution of responsibilities
between the various levels.  Negotiations with Dutch importers and producers
of ‘white goods’ failed in first instance because the sector was afraid that EU
guidelines would again change the deal. Also the - multinational - mother
companies were hoping that EU guidelines would be more relaxed than the
evolving negotiated agreement and withdrew the sector’s associating from the
negotiations. When a regulation was installed fixing the (almost) negotiated
deal, the sector embraced it nevertheless and thereafter tried to promote ‘the
Dutch solution’ to become EU standard guideline; so both public and private
governance were involved in an intricate multi-level game.
Level → Resources
This concerns a big leap over the more stepwise relations between these two
elements. This means that there may not be much left for a direct influence of
one element over the other.
From the values perspective an attempt will be made to create a certain
balance, not only in the way the problem is tackled but also in the allocation of
resources between the various sub-areas of the administrative levels.
From the cognitive perspective the allocation of resources will mainly reflect
what the problem is perceived to be, but this is an indirect relation via the
problem perception.
From the resources perspective, the resources distributed will mainly be those
that are available at the level concerned.
When the Dutch government wanted to strengthen the
implementation of environmental laws by the local authorities after several
other attempts it turned to providing these with very substantial additional
money flows, because other approaches simply didn’t work well enough. This
was done even though some professional observers labeled it as “the one
public authority bribing other authorities into obeying the law”.
Resources → Level
From a values perspective we can expect the administrative level that gets
the most resources, related to the to problem domain, (continues to) feel most
responsibility for the problem.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect the administrative level that gets
the most resources to strengthen its own interpretation of the problem as one
belonging primarily to that administrative level.
19
From a resources perspective we can expect that the administrative level that
gets the most resources will, partly as a result of this, retain the strongest
position.
All in all taking up responsibilities in the multi-level governance setup
depends partially on the possibilities to gather the resources necessary for the
action that is perceived as a consequence.
Strategies → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the division of responsibilities
between administrative levels associated with a particular strategy influences
what people think about who should have these responsibilities, also
concerning administrative level.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the strategy raises the level
of knowledge of the problem and the possible responses mostly in the
administrative level that has most to do.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the position of the
administrative levels that have a more important role in the selected strategy
will be strengthened relative to other levels.
When the national level in Italy proved incapable of concluding
negotiated arrangements due to various (self)restrictions, the regional and
local levels jumped in the gap by concluding a wealth of agreements taking
over the initiative on various fields of the environmental problematic.
Problem and policy ambition → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the way in which the problem is
described has implications for the administrative level that ought to feel most
responsible for the problem.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect a similar effect to occur regarding
the question of what is considered to be the most suitable administrative level
in the dominant paradigm, given the scale of the problems.
From a resources perspective we can expect that, for a particular problem, a
certain paradigm will strengthen or weaken the relative position of
administrative levels in relation to the others.
All these phenomena appear to be present in the Netherlands because
of the rise of the National Environmental Policy Plan and the target group
approach. These have strengthened the national level (at which most
covenants are agreed) with respect to the provincial and local levels (where
most of the licenses are issued and which carry out most of the enforcement
duties).
Network → Level
From a values perspective we can expect that the dominant values of the
actors in the network (as opposed to their own interests) can be relevant for
the distribution of governance over the various levels.
From a cognitive perspective we can expect that the dominant policy vision of
the actors in the network can be relevant for the distribution of governance
over the various levels.
From a resources perspective we can expect that the dominant actors in the
network will also influence the distribution of governance between the
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administrative levels and that this distribution will be a reflection of the relative
position of the dominant actors.
Scientific ‘epistemic’ communities that are able to enter the policy
network can have a considerable impact on the level were the problems are
defines and measures are taken, for instance to take the Mediterranean as a
ecological unity (Haas 1990).
5 Conclusion: three mechanisms
In this chapter we have developed a model of governance to allow us to
compare governance systems in different states or countries as they relate to
a certain policy arena. We identified five elements of governance, one of
which relates to the multilevel aspect. Moreover, we made a main assumption
that mutual adjustment will take place between the five elements of
governance and that this mutual adjustment can be traced back to three
internal mechanisms (secondary assumptions) in the governance system.
Changes in a governance system take place when outside factors intervene
in one of the five elements of the governance system and the other elements
adjust to this new situation.
Differences between times or jurisdictions work consistently through the
governance subsystem from one element to another. This is a feature that
typically leads to adjustment between elements of a governance system, thus
giving that system a ‘genetic’ imprint. It is also interesting to examine which
mechanisms are at work during this process. We stated that our main
assumption rested on three mechanisms (secondary assumptions).
The first mechanism (secondary assumption 1) is that adjustment arises from
the tendency of actors to act from a set of constant values.  The second
mechanism (secondary assumption 2) is that adjustment arises from the
tendency of actors to use a common reference frame to interpret cognition.
The third mechanism (secondary assumption 3) is that adjustment arises from
the dependence of actors on each other’s resources. Such dependence is
clearly expressed in the demarcation of powers between administrative levels
and between administrative actors.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that ‘governance’ involves more
elements than policy objectives and the means to implement policy. These
elements are not simply the sum of individual aspects but are closely linked.
We have tried to illustrate how these interrelations work.
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